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International trade and the natural resource ‘curse’ in Southeast Asia: 
does China’s growth threaten regional development?  
 




China’s growth, along with its increasing integration with world markets through WTO 
accession, abolition of Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) quotas, and reduced trade barriers 
with ASEAN, is expected to have significant effects on the structure of regional production 
and trade.  Through bilateral trade growth as well as through competition with China in 
global markets, Southeast Asia’s resource-abundant economies will become more intensive 
in natural resource-based exports and much less so in low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing 
such as garments.  Both these effects will tend to increase demand for natural resources, one 
through a direct product market effect, the other by driving down the price of a 
complementary input, low-skill labor.   
A question that then arises is how these trends will interact with the other major 
phenomenon currently sweeping through Southeast Asia, namely decentralization.  With 
reduced national government power and little or no accountability at the local level, the 
potential for disastrous rates of resource exploitation is high.  If sufficiently severe, the 
combination of increased demand for natural resources and diminished constraints on their 
could expose the region to reduced rates of economic growth, a variant of the “natural 
resource curse” argument, which maintains that resource-abundant economies grow more 
slowly than others. 
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 The “curse” of natural resource abundance 
The “natural resource curse” is one of the more colorful phrases to be coined about a major 
subject in development economics, alongside the ill-fated “East Asian Miracle”.  The “curse” 
is of slow growth due to a failure to sustain efficient factor use, especially in industrial 
sectors where the potential for productivity gain is highest.  According to Sachs and Warner, 
“there is virtually no overlap between the set of countries with large natural resource 
endowments—and the set of countries that have high levels of GDP” (2001:828).  Moreover, 
“extremely resource-abundant countries such as the Oil States in the Gulf, or Nigeria, or 
Mexico and Venezuela, have not experienced rapid economic growth… resource intensity 
tends to correlate with slow economic growth” (ibid).   
If these predictions are generally true, then students of Southeast Asian economic 
development face two puzzles.  First, are resource-abundant Southeast Asian economies that 
have experienced periods of sustained high rates of economic growth different in some way 
from the group of countries from whose past experiences the Sachs and Warner statement is 
derived? Second, is there anything in current market and policy trends that might predispose 
resource-abundant economies to lower growth in the future?   
Two concurrent phenomena challenge the continued economic success of Southeast 
Asia’s resource-rich economies.  First, the continued growth and structural transformation of 
China, along with its increasing integration in world markets through actions such as WTO 
accession, abolition of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) garment export quotas, and 
reduced trade barriers with Japan, East Asia and ASEAN, is expected to have significant 
effects on the structure of Southeast Asian production and trade.  Recent World Bank 
estimates indicate that China’s increasing size and involvement in global and regional trade 
will cause Southeast Asia’s resource-abundant economies to become more intensive in 
resource-based exports, and less so in low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing such as 
garments.  These trends will increase exploitation rates of natural resources directly through 
product market changes, and indirectly by driving down the price of low-skilled labor.   
The second phenomenon is decentralization of control over natural resource stocks 
and their disposal in the countries of Southeast Asia.  Decentralization, while it has many 
positive attributes, has a distinctly mixed record where management of ‘national’ wealth 
(forests, fisheries, water resources, etc) is concerned.  A theme of this paper is that if 
decentralization undermines the management and protection of natural resource stocks, the 
China trade effect could lead to a lower-welfare outcome.   
The chapter begins with a discussion of the ‘curse’ and a review of related evidence.  
We then consider briefly the relevant data from resource-rich Southeast Asian countries, an 
analysis leading to the question, what effect will China’s expansion and increasing 
integration with world markets have on the structure of Southeast Asian production and 
trade?  Subsequently, we explore possible ways in which the hypothesized structural changes 
might interact with a new policy and institutional setting in decentralizing Southeast Asian 
resource-rich economies.  The chapter concludes with some more speculative thoughts on 
possible future growth paths, welfare results and environmental outcomes for Southeast Asia.       
What is the curse? 
Resource abundance, it is argued, contributes to low growth rates and thus to divergence in 
per capita incomes between resource-rich and resource-poor economies.  Figure 1, from   2 
Sachs and Warner (2001), plots GDP growth rates against a measure of natural resource 
wealth for a large sample of countries; in this bivariate comparison at least, a negative 
association is clearly implied.   
More than one explanation can be offered for this.  First, the “Dutch disease” effects 
of natural resource exports inhibit growth in manufacturing, a sector whose growth is 
commonly believed to confer positive productivity externalities, giving rise to increasing 
returns at the sectoral level.  Slower growth of manufacturing, due to competition for labor 
and capital from resource sectors and secondary growth in non-traded sectors, reduces the 
gains available from manufacturing growth.
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Second, it has been argued that exploitation of natural resource wealth reduces the 
return to human capital, and thus diminishes incentives for educational attainment (Gylfason 
2001).  Resource-rich countries therefore encounter a form of low-level equilibrium trap 
when attempting to climb product variety or quality ladders in manufacturing, where human 
capital inputs are increasingly intensively employed.  
Third, a variety of political economy arguments present some form of the case that 
resource wealth promotes the ascendance of the ‘predatory state’ over the ‘developmental 
state’, either by actively encouraging the former through corruption related to resource rents, 
or by undermining the latter when revenue flows associated with resource extraction reduce 
the efficiency of policy and administration (Auty 2001).  This set of arguments has been 
made with particular force in case studies of Latin American and sub-Saharan Africa 
(Acemoglu et al. 2002, 2004).     
Fourth, lower growth has also been attributed to the destabilizing consequences of 
Dutch disease, which causes relative shrinkage in non-resource tradable sector output.  The 
greater relative prominence of non-tradable sectors in GDP due to the spending effects of a 
boom increases aggregate vulnerability to terms of trade shocks or global market volatility, 
since the burden of adjustment, rather than being distributed between a combination of 
intersectoral resource movements and expenditure effects, falls on expenditure effects alone, 
creating real exchange rate instability (Hausmann and Rigobon 2002).   
Despite the intuitive appeal of these arguments, the natural resource curse hypothesis 
has also attracted considerable critical attention.  A number of arguments can be made to the 
effect that what may appear to be slow growth caused by natural resource wealth is instead 
the product of other phenomena not directly related to resource exploitation.  In particular, it 
is important that the slow growth observed by Sachs and Warner and others in a sample of 
developing economies is not consistent over time; rather, growth rates in many resource-
abundant economies were very high in the 1960s and 1970s, but decelerated in the 1980s. 
The structural stability of regression results in which growth rates (the endogenous variables) 
are averaged over fairly long periods is questionable.  Slower growth rates in the 1980s, in 
particular, were not unique to resource-abundant economies, and could instead have been the 
products of debt overhang or other post-oil shock imbalances and incomplete adjustment 
(Manzano and Rigobon 2001), in addition to the effects of the global commodity price 
collapses of the early 1980s.   
  Other criticisms have focused on the econometric strategies from which empirical 
conclusions about the existence of the curse have been derived.  One such argument 
distinguishes between measures of resource abundance and resource dependence.  Sachs-
Warner and others mainly use dependence measures (e.g. trade intensities), but these are   3 
vulnerable to claims of endogeneity, especially when the effects of policies affecting 
exchange rates or the growth of other tradables sectors are taken in to account.   
  Another question concerns the definition of abundance (or dependence) and the 
stability of the group of countries defined as such.  This debate is analogous to that over 
‘openness’, in which a country might be classed as ‘open’ by one set of measures but not by 
another (Rodriguez and Rodrik 1999).  By contrast with the approach taken in the trade and 
growth literature, Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) do not offer a firm criterion for resource 
‘abundance’ or ‘dependence’; their conclusions, however, beg the question of how much 
resource wealth is ‘too much’. 
Finally, it is of interest to note that in the empirical growth literature, there are very 
few instances of regression models not focused specifically on the resource curse hypothesis 
in which resource abundance emerges as a significant factor affecting long-run growth rates 
(for a survey, see Li and Coxhead 2004).   
A reasonable conclusion to draw from this review is that while there are strong 
theoretical grounds to suspect a broad correspondence between natural resource wealth and 
low rates of economic growth, the causal link, if it exists at all, is neither direct nor simple.  
Rather, the negative association requires one or more distortions, market failures, or perhaps 
institutional failures.  It may be that each resource-abundant country experiences its own 
resource wealth-growth relationship, based on unique institutional and economic 
characteristics, but that all such experiences lead to similar outcomes.
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How Southeast Asia averted the curse 
All of the above symptoms of the ‘curse’ can be seen in some form in each resource-
abundant Southeast Asian country. Paradoxically, however, the region’s resource-rich 
economies have in fact grown very rapidly by world standards.  Therefore, if the curse does 
apply to developing countries in general, the economies of this region have undergone (or are 
undergoing) some other development experience unique to them (and perhaps a very few 
other economies, such as Botswana) that more than compensates for its effects.  The most 
obvious candidate explanation is the post-Plaza Accord boom in Japanese and East Asian 
FDI into the region, a trend whose intensity kick-started labor-intensive industrialization and 
ensured the inclusion of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia in the World Bank’s group of 
eight “East Asian Miracle” economies, alongside the much richer Northeast Asian industrial 
economies and Singapore.  Not only did these three economies grow very rapidly and in 
sustained fashion over more than a decade after 1986; they also underwent structural changes 
that dramatically reduced their relative reliance on natural resources.  By the early 1990s, all 
of Southeast Asia’s market economies exported far more manufactures by value than 
agricultural and natural resource products.  For these economies, then, we may hypothesize 
that the rapid expansion of labor-intensive manufacturing employment in the mid-late 1980s, 
caused by heavy inflows of foreign investment, forestalled the onset of the resource curse by 
inducing rapid structural change.  
For virtually all other resource-abundant developing economies, the 1980s was a “lost 
decade” in which export price crashes, high and rising debt service costs, and net capital 
outflows led to sustained low or negative rates of GDP growth.  Southeast Asia’s resource-
rich economies, except the Philippines, experienced very mild recessions or slowdowns in 
1985 followed by a decade of historically rapid expansion.  Since the late 1990s, however, 
the region has seen a significant reversal: declining FDI inflows, increased demand for   4 
natural resource exports, and intensified competition in global markets for labor-intensive 
manufactures– all three trends driven in large part by the emergence of China in the global 
economy.  Given these trends, could Southeast Asia still succumb to the resource curse?   
Barring wars and catastrophic policy reversals, a necessary condition for the 
emergence of China to threaten the continued growth of the semi-industrialized, resource-
abundant Southeast Asian economies is that their comparative advantage shifts dramatically 
back in the direction of natural resources.  Such a shift clearly is not a sufficient condition, 
however; it will hurt growth only if it interacts with market failures or other distortions.  
Distortions make it possible, in principle, for specialization in resource exports to lead to 
over-rapid depletion of resource stocks, as well as slower growth of manufacturing output 
and jobs, reduced human capital investments, and the loss of productivity spillovers 
associated with manufacturing industry growth.  In the next two sections we first explore the 
shift in comparative advantage, then examine some ways in which such a shift might interact 
with known market and institutional failures to produce a “new” resource curse outcome.   
Southeast Asian responses to Chinese growth 
Intra-East Asia
4 trade volumes have expanded enormously since the 1980s.  At 15% per year 
in 1985-2001, trade growth within East Asia far exceeded that for any other region (for 
NAFTA the corresponding figure is 9.1%).  East Asia-China trade is an increasingly 
important component of intraregional trade, rising from less than 1% of the total in 1975 to 
7% in 2001 (Ng and Yeats 2003).  China, with 43% of regional GDP in 2001, accounts for 
30% of the region’s exports (ibid: 9).  China’s growth, sustained at a rate of about 7% per 
year for many years, is a major driver of increased regional trade.  At the same time, the 
Chinese economy has also become far more trade-dependent since the late 1980s, a shift 
caused by many factors, not least of which are the country’s accession to the WTO and the 
liberalization of trade with regional neighbors, including ASEAN.  
ASEAN’s share in China’s total imports rose from 6% to 9% in the 1990s, a 390% 
increase in value terms (Ianchovichina and Walmsley 2003:4).  ASEAN economies saw big 
increases in the share of their regional trade going to China, and the value of their exports to 
China rose much faster than total exports (Table 1, and see Ng and Yeats 2003, Table 6.1).  
This pattern of growth is expected to continue, albeit not necessarily at the same rate, for at 
least the next decade.  
 
Competition in global markets 
In manufacturing industries, China’s expansion is expected to have mixed effects.  
Implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the process for an orderly 
dismantling of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), will be highly influential.  By eliminating 
the MFA’s national quotas on apparel exports to the US and EU, the ATC will remove a 
serious distortion that has worked against the lowest-cost producers, notably China.
5 
At the same time, ASEAN-China competition has intensified in third country 
markets, mainly but by no means exclusively in labor-intensive, low-tech products.  China’s 
WTO accession, which increased its market access and reduced the cost of imported 
intermediates for its manufacturers, undermined the international competitiveness of key 
Southeast Asian manufacturing sectors (Ianchovichina and Walmsley 2003, Ianchovichina 
and Martin 2004).  Furthermore, if new FDI flows match the shifting pattern of production, 
then China’s lead in these sectors can be expected to widen further in the longer run.      5 
How important are these trends?  The answer depends, in part, on the extent to which 
China and Southeast Asian countries compete or complement one another in trade.  One 
measure of this, the extent of overlap in export product categories, reveals a high overlap 
between China’s exports and those of Indonesia, and rising overlap between China and 
exports from other Southeast Asian economies except the Philippines (Table 2).  The degree 
of overlap has been increasing as the Chinese manufacturing sector expands (increasing the 
number of product lines exported) and becomes more capital-intensive (Kwan 2003, Weiss 
and Gao 2002).
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Measures of revealed comparative advantage (RCA, Balassa 1965) provide more 
detailed indications of multilateral trade intensity.  The RCA measures the intensity of a 
country’s exports of a good relative to the intensity of world exports of that good.
7  By 
convention, values of RCAjkt > 1 (< 1) are inferred to mean that country j has comparative 
advantage (disadvantage) in production of good k in year t.
8  Table 3 reports RCA measures 
computed from the most recent data for major product categories in China and several 
Southeast Asian countries (values greater than one are shown in bold).  China shows low 
RCA values for most agricultural sectors (product categories 00-23; 41-43) and natural 
resource sectors (24-32), and very high values for all kinds of assembly (71-81; notably 
electrical equipment, electronics, computers and components and office equipment) as well 
as in furniture (82), and garments, footwear and accessories (83-85).  In Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have the greatest range of high RCA values in agriculture 
and resource sectors.  These economies, like China, also show evidence of comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive industries like furniture, garments, footwear, bags and 
accessories, electrical appliances, and electronics.   
 
Trends in bilateral comparative advantage 
The RCA measures compare country export intensities with global data.  Rising bilateral 
trade shares between ASEAN countries and China motivate a comparison of bilateral 
comparative advantage, as a means of evaluating the likely impacts of China’s growth on 
Southeast Asian trade patterns.  These comparisons can be made by subtracting the China 
RCA value from that of each Southeast Asian country, and are shown for Indonesia and 
Vietnam in figures 2 and 3.
9  The bilateral data display a very clear pattern in which these 
countries have a relative advantage in agricultural and natural resource industries, and in a 
few processing sectors intensive in the use of natural resource or agricultural inputs, while 
China dominates in heavy industry and most light assembly operations.  The extent to which 
Southeast Asian economies, particularly Indonesia and Vietnam, are, or are becoming, 
complementary with China is revealed also by correlation coefficients of the RCA measures 
(Table 4).  Negative values of this measure indicate a tendency for countries to specialize in 
exports of products other than those in which China is specialized; positive numbers indicate 
greater overlap.  The trends in the table suggest that Malaysia is complementary with China 
and Thailand’s overlap is diminishing; Vietnam has high overlap and Indonesia shows a 
trend from weak complementarity to more overlap.   
On current trade trends, Southeast Asian countries can expect to become major 
suppliers of natural resource products to the Chinese market, importing a wide range of 
manufactures in return, and with continued growth of the size of the China market, these 
patterns will become increasingly dominant in overall Southeast Asian trade.    6 
The drivers of shifts in the structure of Southeast Asian production and trade are 
potentially large and operate both directly and indirectly.  Direct effects on exporters of many 
manufactures will be measured through negative terms of trade shifts, though these will be 
offset in some industries by cheaper imported intermediates.  Indirect effects will be felt 
through adjustments in the markets for labor and other factors, and possibly also through 
shifts in the sectoral composition and national distribution of FDI flows.  A very large 
fraction of the Southeast Asian manufacturing labor force is employed in garments, textiles 
and other labor-intensive low-tech industries identified as under threat from Chinese 
competition.  In Indonesia, textile and apparel production accounts for 20% of non-oil 
exports by value, and 25% of employment in large and medium manufacturing industries 
(James et al. 2003).  In Vietnam, garments are 14% of exports by value and the industry 
employs more than 24% of a manufacturing labor force of 4.6 million workers; in Cambodia, 
garments account for 80% both of exports and of the manufacturing labor force (UNIDO).
10 
Loss of these sources of export revenue, and the lower wages (or reduced wage growth) that 
this will cause, will tend to reduce labor costs in natural resource industries, contributing 
indirectly to increased profitability over and above the direct effects from growth of Chinese 
demand for their products.
11  Another indirect driver will be foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows; the evidence is ambiguous, but one likely trend is to reduced FDI in Southeast Asian 
industries where competition with China is intense, perhaps offset somewhat by increased 
FDI in medium-tech or high-tech sectors (Ng and Yeats 2003; Krumm and Kharas 2003).   
Another important area in which China’s growth, trade expansion and huge FDI 
inflows all combine to affect Southeast Asian trade is in forest products.  China’s imports of 
forest products—logs, lumber, pulp and paper, plywood, veneer, woodchips and other 
products—have more than doubled since 1997 (Sun et al. 2004).  Flows have increased faster 
since China imposed a ban on domestic logging in 2001.  Much of the new trade has been 
met by increased imports from Russia, but Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand continue to 
supply a large fraction of total imports.  Moreover, the rapid industrialization of the Chinese 
economy has seen relative declines in imports of the more highly processed forest products in 
favor of logs and lumber, as domestic processing capacity has expanded (Sun et al. 2004). 
Indonesia, for example, has increased its forest product exports to China by about 60% since 
1997, but the largest increases by far have come in logs and lumber; plywood, once the major 
export, has declined, and Malaysia and Thailand have similar experiences (ibid.).  
In summary, China’s growth and globalization is likely to cause Southeast Asian 
countries to experience negative terms of trade shocks for their manufactures and positive 
shocks for primary products.  The countries most obviously affected will be Indonesia and 
Vietnam.  Domestic adjustment to China’s growth, if it occurs, will increase Southeast Asia’s 
output of products that are intensive in their use both of natural resources and low-skilled 
labor.  In the short to medium run this shift could stimulate aggregate economic growth; but 
the longer-run growth and welfare effects will be contingent on more unknowns, including 
the continued growth of China; other world market and policy trends,
12 and the domestic 
policy and institutional environment.   
Decentralization and the management of natural resources 
Local government mandates and motives 
Conventional wisdom in the development community has turned decisively in favor of 
devolved approaches to economic growth and even to environmental and natural resource   7 
management (e.g. World Bank 2000).  The devolution trend has been welcomed in principle 
by many development specialists, especially as it coincides with and is reinforced by a 
general trend towards democratization at the sub-national level.   
There are, however, clear problems with decentralized management.  Paramount 
among these is that local administrations are far more motivated to raise revenues and create 
jobs than to protect the environment, especially when the benefits may be exported beyond 
local boundaries and planning horizons to communities downstream, elsewhere, or yet 
unborn.   
Several other problems are also frequently observed.  Incomplete democratization of 
local governments is a critical constraint on the effectiveness of local management: where 
local administrations are not accountable to their constituents, devolving authority may 
merely result in accelerated degradation.  Capacity constraints bedevil the efforts even of the 
best and most sincere local administrations; most are simply too small to cover the fixed 
costs of specialists in resource management, legislative design, enforcement, or other critical 
areas.  Moreover, the question of optimal policy ‘control areas’ for local administrations 
whose resource management activities affect production of transboundary externalities (both 
downstream, nationally, and in the cases of biodiversity and atmospheric carbon releases, 
globally) has yet to be seriously confronted (Rola and Coxhead 2004).  The cards are thus 
stacked against effective local management of natural resources.   
Lastly, ill-conceived administrative rules on decentralization undermine capacity for 
policy or action at all levels of government.  In most countries, decentralization includes a 
shift of personnel away from central government offices, and the power of local branches of 
central government environmental agencies is frequently subordinated to that of local 
jurisdictions.  If local administrations are weak, however, or compromised by conflicting 
goals and/or corrupt practices, the result of this shift is that control is exerted neither at the 
center, nor at the local level.   
 
Legal and institutional frameworks 
The period of decentralization has seen central governments commit to giving more power 
over environmental and natural resource management to local governments and 
communities, but the legal basis for such actions is only weakly established, and the practical 
issues of implementation are far from being worked out (Rola and Coxhead 2004). 
Indonesia, unfortunately, exemplifies the range of ways in which decentralization can 
undermine effective resource management.  Under the New Order regime, forest 
management policies and processes were codified, for the most part, in the 1967 Basic 
Forestry Law (BFL). This established a legal and institutional framework for state-supported 
commercial forest exploitation.  The central government was paramount; in particular, 
tensions between commercial/industrial rights and rights of communities over forest use were 
resolved by “categorically excluding” the latter and denying legitimacy to adat (traditional 
law) (Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002: 215).  Laws passed in 1999 amended the BFL, while 
others in 2000 devolved substantive powers to local government.  However these initiatives, 
which mark the country’s first genuine attempt at decentralized forest management, are 
unclear on state versus local powers and responsibilities.  They are, moreover, laws enacted 
in a transitional moment during which regional and village elites, freed from the strictures of 
centralized New Order governance, began themselves to initiate a de facto decentralization of 
local development policy.  Lacking either a strong (though arbitrary) central state or a clear   8 
set of rules for decentralized forest management, “policy implementation has depended to a 
great degree on personalities and place. The lack of certainty in the law, combined with the 
lack of a legal structure linking the forest resource to its users, has created a free-for-all in 
which forest management has become the responsibility of no-one” (Colfer and 
Resosudarmo 2002:24).  Virtually the only certainty is that Indonesian timber removal rates, 
at about 80 million cubic meters per year, exceed even Jakarta’s own ‘sustainability criterion’ 
by a factor of more than three (ibid., p. 216).  
 
Fiscal policies 
Other design faults in Southeast Asian decentralizations have helped to create conditions 
under which local governments are likely to tolerate high rates of resource depletion.  In 
general, local governments have very limited capacity for revenue-raising through taxation, 
charges, or user fees.  In Indonesia, the general purpose equalization transfer (DAU) to sub-
national governments applies a formula for ‘fiscal capacity’ that counts only a fraction of 
natural resource revenues.  There is, in other words, a reduced fiscal penalty to resource-rich 
sub-national administrations that choose to increase resource extraction rates, and “[t]his is a 
significant windfall gain for those local governments that receive large amounts of shared 
revenues from natural resources” (Lewis 2001:333; see also Brodjonegoro and Martinez-
Vazquez 2002).  Under Law No. 25/1999 (fiscal decentralization), Indonesia’s regions retain 
15% of oil revenues, 30% of gas revenues, and 80% of revenues from other forms of natural 
resources (Hill 2002:26).   
National government expenditures on environment in Indonesia are low by regional 
standards, and during the crisis of 1997-98 were shown to be especially vulnerable to cuts, 
falling relative to both GDP and the national budget (Vincent et al. 2002).  If these data are 
indicative of central government commitments to environmental protection, local 
administrations bent on raising revenues through environmentally damaging (or resource-
depleting) means need not worry unduly that Jakarta will call them to task.
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Vietnam’s recent experience is similar.  Its major exports by value in 2003 were 
dominated by textiles and garments (18%), but all the other major categories are resource 
products: marine products (11%), and rice, coffee, wood products and rubber (11%); and 
China is a key trading partner (Table 1).  Decentralization in Vietnam is stimulating a race 
for resources similar to that in Indonesia, with inadequate legal sanctions for violators of 
laws on land, forest and water use.  As in Indonesia, an increase in Vietnam’s comparative 
advantage in natural resource products relative to its enormous neighbor and trading partner 
will lead to increased demand for land, forest conversion and related resource-depleting 
trends.  In this setting local administrations— even those with significant pro-environment 
constituencies— will be hard-pressed to enforce limitations on resource depletion or 
pollution.
14   
 
Localization, globalization and the resource curse 
The shifts in Southeast Asian economic structure caused by China’s expansion and 
increasing global integration are potentially huge, and seem systematically to involve 
expansion of natural resource-intensive industries and contraction of many labor-intensive 
assembly sectors. As was pointed out earlier, however, these changes can only reduce growth 
or economic welfare in the way predicted by the resource curse hypothesis if they encounter 
distortions that inhibit an optimal policy response.  In Southeast Asia, there is a high   9 
probability that such a distortion will be encountered in the form of incomplete controls over 
exploitation of natural resource stocks.  Moreover, recent steps toward decentralization 
appear greatly to have reduced the probability that resource stocks will be managed in a 
socially optimal manner in the future.  With resource management powers poorly defined and 
imperfectly or corruptly exercised, the economies of the region are coming to resemble ever 
more closely the hypothetical economy in Brander and Taylor (1997), in which an economy 
having comparative advantage in an open-access natural resource reduces its own welfare by 
entering into trade.  In the absence of effective controls on resource depletion, and with no 
guarantee of future control over resource rents, such an economy experiences a race by all 
actors to liquidate natural resource wealth in the short term; in the longer term, therefore, it 
grows more slowly or not at all.  China’s expansion could well fuel such a sequence of events 
in Southeast Asia.  If it does, the real problem will lie not in China’s voracious import 
demand, but in the failings of Southeast Asian domestic policies and institutions.  
Conclusions 
Southeast Asian countries’ past experience contradicts the resource curse hypothesis, but will 
continuing globalization render the region’s most resource-abundant economies vulnerable to 
a new variant?  In particular, will China’s growth deliver slower growth to the economies 
that escaped the crisis of the 1980s?   
The trade and investment effects of China’s expansion are predicted to have slightly 
negative overall effects on the region, moderating the generally positive predicted effects of 
global trade liberalization and growth.  Countries like Vietnam and Indonesia, whose 
industry sectors are less diversified, will suffer relatively more that those such as Malaysia, 
especially given the latter’s strength in high-tech sectors.  The all-important apparel, 
footwear and related industries are especially vulnerable, and their decline may have 
economy-wide consequences through labor market adjustments.  Growth in demand for 
natural resource products, accompanied by declining or at least less rapidly growing real 
wages, will stimulate output in extractive industries such as forestry and mining, in rubber, 
oil palm and other and other industrial crops, and in specialized horticultural crops (tropical 
fruit, coffee) as well as in fisheries.  The growth of these sectors’ output will reflect shifts in 
Southeast Asia’s comparative advantage associated with the China effect.  
The long-term consequences of this possible reorientation of Southeast Asian 
economies will be slight, if legal and economic institutions exist to account for the true 
opportunity costs of the new mix of activities.  However, to the extent that additional demand 
for timber, fisheries, and agricultural land is unrestrained by legal safeguards or externality-
correcting economic instruments, higher commodity demands and lower labor costs may 
spark an acceleration in resource-extracting activities, including the conversion of forests to 
industrial agriculture.  In some areas of the region, these changes, being difficult if not 
impossible to reverse, could spell long-term reductions in earnings power and increased 
vulnerability to environmental disasters.  I have argued in this chapter that the likelihood of 
such outcomes is higher where incomplete decentralization has devolved powers over 
resource use without commensurate responsibilities.  
Some caveats should of course be borne in mind.  Continued rapid growth in the 
Chinese economy will eventually begin to drive wages up, a trend that will reduce the 
competitiveness of China’s most labor-intensive sectors in global markets.  Revaluation of 
the yuan, fixed for a decade relative to the US dollar, would have an analogous effect, with   10 
the most import-intensive Chinese industries and those serving mainly the domestic market 
gaining relative to others– both trends that will undercut labor-intensive, high valued-added 
industries such as garments and furniture.  In Southeast Asia, niche-market producers of 
specialized product lines will undoubtedly survive and thrive, even in an era of general 
decline of the industries to which they belong.  Finally, economies with greater 
complementarity or diminishing overlap, such as Malaysia and Thailand, will stand to gain 
from freer trade with a rapidly growing Chinese economy, and the growth of specialized 
sectors such as computer components and other high-end electronics should offset some of 
the more harmful effects described in this chapter (these prospects are not especially strong 
in the most resource-abundant economies, however, especially Indonesia and Vietnam).  
Each of these possibilities merits careful attention and more detailed research.  
Turning to policy implications, it remains to be seen whether the possible changes 
identified in this chapter will merit the term “curse”.  First, these changes will take place in a 
context of overall (predicted) gains from globalization, from which the China effect could 
shave perhaps 25% (Ianchovichina and Walmsley 2003; Strutt and Anderson 2000).  
Sustained economic growth, as is well known, simultaneously raises demands for the 
conservation of resources, and creates the capacity to implement such demands—
mechanisms captured in the idea of an environmental Kuznets curve.  Second, the resource 
curse depends on market or institutional failures, including the effects of weak institutions of 
governance.  Where such institutions are strong, property rights (including those of 
consumers of pollution) are generally better-protected, thereby inhibiting race-to-the-bottom 
resource exploitation strategies.  On this score, the uplands of Vietnam and the other 
Indochinese countries, and the outer islands of Indonesia—areas in Asia where the 
restraining hand of central government is weakest—appear to be the most vulnerable.  Other 
countries and regions display more heterogeneous experiences, some of which may be 
relevant to more vulnerable areas.  How the interactions of decentralization and global 
market trends affect natural resource management in these areas will be a critical factor 
determining the future of their forests, soils and other natural resource stocks and, ultimately, 
the welfare of their human populations.    11 
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Table 1:  Southeast Asia: China trade shares (per cent) and rank among trading partners 
Country     1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Malaysia  Export  2.10  2.56  3.09  4.33  5.63  10.78 
  Rank  10  9  9  6  5  3 
  Import  1.92  2.20  3.94  5.19  7.74  6.82 
    7  7  5  4  4  4 
               
Indonesia  Export  3.25  3.83  4.46  3.91  5.08  7.43 
    5  5  5  5  5  4 
  Import  2.97  3.68  6.03  5.95  7.76  11.72 
    7  8  5  5  4  2 
               
Philippines  Export  0.75  1.20  1.74  2.47  3.85  12.00 
    10  10  10  10  8  3 
  Import  1.40  2.34  2.28  2.95  3.54  6.99 
    9  8  9  7  7  4 
               
Thailand  Export  1.16  2.87  4.07  4.40  5.16  7.09 
    10  6  6  5  5  4 
  Import  3.31  2.84  5.45  5.98  7.61  8.00 
    6  7  4  3  3  3 
               
Vietnam  Export  0.31  6.44  10.61  9.44  6.45  6.40 
    6  3  2  2  4  4 
  Import  0.16  3.94  8.96  9.91  11.82  14.06 
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Table 2: Southeast Asian competition with China in the US market (per cent overlap in 
product categories, aggregated using value weights) 
Country  1990  1995  2000 
Singapore  14.8  19.2  35.8 
Indonesia  85.3  85.5  82.8 
Malaysia  37.1  38.9  48.7 
Philippines  46.3  47.8  46.1 
Thailand  42.2  56.3  65.4 
Source: Kwan (2002), Table 2.    16 
Table 3: RCA values (2000-03 average) for China and Southeast Asia 
Name  Code
a  CHN  IDN  MYS  PHL
b  THA  VNM
c 
 Live animals   00  0.78  0.39  0.72  0.06  0.23  0.18 
 Meat and meat preparations  01  0.58  0.06  0.04  0.01  1.77  0.29 
 Dairy products and birds' eggs  02  0.06  0.27  0.23  0.19  0.27  1.85 
 Fish, crustaceans, etc  03  1.83  3.47  0.51  1.44  7.59  13.60 
 Cereals and cereal preparations  04  0.70  0.16  0.20  0.12  3.12  5.54 
 Vegetables and fruit  05  1.14  0.46  0.20  1.62  1.67  2.78 
 Sugars, sugar preparations  06  0.43  0.43  0.44  0.75  4.78  1.08 
 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices  07  0.46  4.28  0.84  0.09  0.26  10.41 
 Feeding stuff for animals   08  0.34  0.49  0.36  0.27  1.29  0.06 
 Misc. edible products   09  0.68  0.83  0.98  0.52  1.64  1.72 
 Beverages  11  0.27  0.04  0.23  0.08  0.26  0.10 
 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures  12  0.40  1.26  0.70  0.32  0.32  0.44 
 Hides, skins and furskins, raw  21  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.45 
 Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits  22  0.59  0.09  0.04  0.02  0.05  1.32 
 Crude rubber   23  0.14  10.92  4.41  0.29  15.08  7.12 
 Cork and wood  24  0.28  1.25  2.58  0.13  0.47  0.54 
 Pulp and waste paper  25  0.01  3.47  0.00  0.28  0.55  0.00 
 Textile fibres (not yarn or fabric)  26  0.95  0.78  0.27  0.17  1.23  0.15 
 Crude fertilizers and minerals nes  27  1.66  0.78  0.19  0.22  1.81  0.35 
 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap  28  0.07  4.25  0.11  0.84  0.23  0.37 
 Crude animal & veg. materials n.e.s  29  1.34  0.58  0.16  0.82  0.69  1.49 
 Coal, coke and briquettes  32  2.84  7.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.93 
 Petroleum & petroleum products   33  0.24  1.98  0.96  0.15  0.42  3.42 
 Gas, natural and manufactured  34  0.06  8.68  3.14  0.09  0.26  0.00 
 Electric current  35  1.17  0.00  0.02        0.07 
 Animal oils and fats  41  0.09  0.08  0.02  0.02  0.07  0.07 
 Vegetable fats & oils, refined  42  0.11  13.02  13.44  4.51  0.42  1.28 
 Animal or veg fats & oils, proc’d  43  0.07  3.38  15.22  0.78  0.88  0.08 
 Organic chemicals  51  0.54  0.83  0.65  0.05  0.53  0.10 
 Inorganic chemicals  52  1.62  0.57  0.23  0.19  0.24  0.07 
 Dyeing & tanning materials  53  0.73  0.34  0.38  0.08  0.29  0.07 
 Medicinal & pharmaceutical prod.  54  0.30  0.07  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.02 
 Essential oils and resinoids  55  0.25  0.72  0.36  0.15  0.71  0.45 
 Fertilizers (other than group 272)  56  0.56  1.10  0.62  0.52  0.12  0.13 
 Plastics in primary forms  57  0.17  0.62  0.70  0.07  1.78  0.04 
 Plastics in non-primary forms  58  0.27  0.57  0.49  0.20  0.58  0.17 
 Chemical materials & products, nes  59  0.53  0.30  0.57  0.13  0.61  0.26 
 Leather, leather manufactures nes  61  1.34  0.44  0.11  0.04  1.73  0.33 
 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.  62  0.74  0.96  0.52  0.27  1.54  0.31 
 Cork & wood manuf excl. furniture  63  1.22  8.83  3.11  0.81  1.08  1.21 
 Paper & paperboard   64  0.31  2.10  0.22  0.15  0.53  0.25 
 Textile yarn, fabrics & articles n.e.s  65  2.51  2.11  0.45  0.31  1.12  0.92 
 Non-metallic mineral manuf, n.e.s.  66  0.91  0.63  0.36  0.26  1.19  0.60 
 Iron and steel  67  0.55  0.34  0.37  0.02  0.52  0.13   17 
Table 3, cont’d 
Name  Code
a  CHN  IDN  MYS  PHL
b  THA  VNM
c 
 Non-ferrous metals  68  0.71  0.98  0.47  0.52  0.29  0.09 
 Manufactures of metals, n.e.s.  69  1.67  0.41  0.44  0.19  0.76  0.26 
 Power-generating machinery  71  0.40  0.28  0.29  0.08  0.64  0.15 
 Machinery specialized for 
particular industries  72  0.31  0.10  0.27  0.18  0.18  0.19 
 Metalworking machinery  73  0.37  0.04  0.23  0.13  0.25  0.06 
 Industrial mach & eqpt, n.e.s.  74  0.71  0.19  0.36  0.15  0.88  0.06 
 Office & data processing machines  75  2.00  0.72  3.52  3.72  2.19  0.55 
 Telecoms apparatus and equipment  76  1.98  1.19  2.57  0.70  1.23  0.14 
 Elect mach and appliances, n.e.s.,   77  1.05  0.46  2.76  5.12  1.60  0.32 
 Road vehicles   78  0.26  0.10  0.05  0.22  0.45  0.09 
 Other transport equipment  79  0.30  0.07  0.12  0.13  0.19  0.04 
 Prefab buildings; sanitary, 
plumbing, heating and lighting 
fixtures and fittings, n.e.s.  81  2.45  0.37  0.22  0.36  0.64  0.18 
 Furniture, and parts thereof  82  1.88  2.44  1.51  0.93  1.28  1.69 
 Travel goods, handbags & similar   83  5.12  0.87  0.06  2.48  2.00  4.33 
 Articles of apparel & clothing  84  4.12  2.28  0.68  2.15  1.61  3.88 
 Footwear  85  4.59  3.02  0.13  0.24  1.51  13.42 
 Prof’l & scientific instruments  87  0.55  0.06  0.62  0.20  0.25  0.07 
 Photographic apparatus & watches  88  1.25  0.29  0.79  0.99  1.05  0.21 
 Misc manufactured articles, n.e.s.  89  2.10  0.55  0.58  0.42  1.06  0.54 
 Special transactions & commodities   93  0.09  0.01  0.42  0.01  1.09  0.83 
 Coin (other than gold coin)  96  0.78  0.01  0.07  0.12  0.27  0.01 
 Gold, non-monetary   97  0.00  1.67  0.36  0.80  0.51  0.06 
Notes: 
a SITC 3 product categories.  
b 2000-02 only.  
c 2000-01 only.  
d Automatic data  
processing.  
Source: UN COMTRADE data.   
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients of RCA measures between China and Southeast Asian 
economies  
Country   1989-1994  1995-1999  2000-2003 
Indonesia  -0.036  -0.015  0.010 
Malaysia  -0.141  -0.127  -0.144 
Philippines  0.147  0.049  0.173 
Thailand  0.311  0.125  0.078 
Vietnam  N/A  0.379  0.408 
Source: Author’s computations from Comtrade data.   
 




Figure 1: Economic growth and natural resource dependence: the Sachs-Warner data   20 
 
Figure 2: RCA differences, Indonesia minus China (Source: author’s computations from 
Comtrade data)   21 
 
Figure 3: RCA differences, Vietnam minus China (Source: author’s computations from 
Comtrade data) 
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Notes 
                                                 
1  University of Wisconsin Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Staff Paper 
Series No. 480.  Presented at the 22
nd annual Indonesia Update, Australian National 
University, Canberra, September 24-25 2004.  I am indebted to Update participants for 
helpful comments, and to Muqun Li and Aksarapak Wongcharoen for excellent research 
assistance.   Send comments to coxhead@wisc.edu 
2  These negative trends, it is stressed, are independent of endogenous terms-of-trade 
explanations for low growth in resource-abundant countries, as posited by the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis. 
3  This may be analogous to the biological concept of convergent evolution, in which (for 
example) birds and bees both have wings not because they have a common ancestor, but 
because they have adapted to their environment in similar ways.  More formally, observation 
of a negative relationship between resource wealth and growth does not imply that all the 
data points are generated by a common underlying process.  A test of this would involve 
searching for significant differences and dividing the data accordingly, as has been done for 
the empirical growth literature (Durlauf and Johnson 1995; Brock and Durlauf 2001).   
4  Defined to include ASEAN. 
5 To see this, it is necessary only to compare China’s market share in the US and EU markets 
with that in the non-quota constrained Japanese market (James et al. 2003). 
6 Some of the increasing similarity in structure of manufacturing production is reflected not 
in competition in third markets but in intraregional inter-industry trade (Athukorala 2003), 
though these potential gains are countered by apparent diversion of FDI from ASEAN to 
China. 







where K denotes the sum of all exports from country j or the world respectively. 
8  Of course, these ex post measures are subject to distortion from several sources, most 
obviously trade policies.  The calculations presented below ignore these sources of 
inaccuracy. 
9 Similar computations for other countries (excluded here to save space) are available from 
the author on request.  
10 Simulations using the GTAP global trade model indicate that the cumulative effects of 
China’s WTO accession over the 2001-10 period will be negative for real GDP growth in 
developing Southeast Asian countries, though with mixed sectoral and country stories.  The 
two big winners are natural resource sectors and high-tech industries.  The clear losers are 
apparel, textiles, and some industries of medium capital intensity, such as automobiles; 
apparel exports are predicted to fall by 20-25%, depending on the country (Ianchovichina and 
Walmsley 2003).  Vietnam, heavily dependent on apparel and with few complementary 
manufacturing sectors, is predicted to experience the greatest loss, about 0.4% of GDP.  For 
Indonesia, an economy-wide analysis of the effects of China’s WTO accession predicted 
marginally slower growth of GDP as a whole, but faster growth in forestry, minerals and 
agriculture and in some secondary industries using these as inputs.  This analysis also   23 
                                                                                                                                                      
predicted a spectacularly large decline (23.4%) for textiles, clothing and leather sectors 
(Strutt and Anderson 2000). 
11  The extent to which labor is mobile from urban manufacturing-sector jobs to agriculture is 
of course an empirical question.  Labor market adjustments during the recent Asian economic 
crises provide helpful pointers: in Indonesia, an official labor market data survey in August 
1998 found that among workers leaving jobs in manufacturing and construction the previous 
year, 39% shifted to agriculture (Manning 2000:126), contributing to a net gain of 4.7m farm 
jobs, a 13.3% year-on-year increase (Hugo 2000).   
12  Within many US producer groups, growing concern about the expansion of China trade is 
motivating calls for additional restrictions.  See NYT September 11 2004.   
13   For excellent recent analyses of decentralization and forest management in Indonesia, see 
Colfer and Resosudarmo 2002.  Papers in this volume also provide insightful coverage of the 
complex issue of the distribution of resource management powers between central and local 
agencies in the Indonesian context.  
14  Just as has been documented among local governments within China itself: “[T]he 
countryside, home to two-thirds of China's population, is increasingly becoming a dumping 
ground. Local officials, desperate to generate jobs and tax revenues, protect factories that 
have polluted for years. Refineries and smelters forced out of cities have moved to rural 
areas” (NYT, “Rivers Run Black”, September 12 2004).  See also FT July 27 2004.   